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Introduction
Muslim militancy is a real and serious problem in South Thailand not just for what it
has caused but also for what it is capable of.  The recent upsurge in violence in the
Muslim-dominated provinces of Southern Thailand which is generally assumed to be a
function of Muslim militancy is a potent reminder that all is not well with the Thai
State’s relations with its Muslim minority and that, probably, the worse is yet to come.
Given that the Muslims constitute the majority population in Thailand’s deep south and
that the name of Islam has often been invoked by the various Muslim groups in their
political struggle for recognition, acceptance and autonomy in the modern Thai polity or
for outright independence from Thailand, it is not difficult to imagine why Muslim
militancy has always been attributed a role in that part of Thailand.  Yet it would be
simplistic if not misleading to assume that the origins, nature, causes and consequences of
Muslim militancy can be satisfactorily explained without taking into account the different
contexts within which it has evolved or that everything can simply be explained by
putting the blame on Muslim militancy.  It is only logical that every problem or conflict
needs to be understood within its proper context—historical, geographical, cultural,
social, political and geo-strategic and the same is certainly true in the case of Muslim
militancy in South Thailand.  There is also a need to clarify what we actually mean by
Muslim militancy.  There seems to be so much ambiguity and even carelessness in the use
of the term.  The term Muslim militancy is often applied to describe acts of violence
committed by Muslims who are believed to have been inspired by their religion in their
political actions.  But the problem is that it may not be that easy to distinguish violence
which is ideological in nature from that which is not, even though it is committed by
people of the same religion.  Thus, in the context of the Malay-Muslim provinces of South
Thailand, while the Muslims have been accused of harbouring militancy they have also
become victims of such militancy as well as other forms of violence including those
sponsored by the state.  The actual situation on the ground is actually far more complex
that it is often made out to be.  This paper hopes to explain the different dimensions of
Muslim militancy and to identify and analyze the contexts within which it has evolved in
South Thailand.  
The paper begins with a brief analytical profile of present-day Thailand and the place
of its Muslim minority within it.  It then proceeds to trace and assess the recent upsurge of
violence in the Muslim-dominated provinces of South Thailand especially since January
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4, 2004.  Subsequently, the historical precedents to the recent violence will be examined
and the various attempts to analyze and explain these will be recapitulated.  The issue of
Muslim militancy in South Thailand will then be discussed highlighting the differing
perceptions of the problem by the different parties involved.  The implications of the on-
going violence which is related to Muslim militancy will then be highlighted.  The
conclusion will briefly refer to the outcome of the February 6, 2005, general election and
its impact on the problem of Muslim militancy in South Thailand.
Profile of Thailand
Thailand is, by any standard, a very big country.  Its population of about sixty four
million people makes it larger than any country in the European Union except Germany.
In terms of size, with an area of about 513,115 square kilometer, it is much bigger than
Japan although slightly smaller than France.  It is the only country in Southeast Asia to
have escaped Western colonization.  It is a constitutional monarchy and ranks among the
first Southeast Asian nation to experiment with democracy.  The normal image of
Thailand is that the Thais are culturally homogeneous with Buddhism as their definitive
religion pervading every sphere of life in the kingdom.  In actual fact, the situation is more
complex than it has been usually portrayed.
The ethnic mosaic in Thailand is amazing although the overwhelming majority of the
Thais have no problem at all identifying themselves as Thais.  Thai identity actually
subsumes many other kinds of identity including ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural
and regional.  The ethnic Thais are indeed the dominant ethnic group in Thailand but the
role of the other ethnic groups, who are often marginalized, should not be
underestimated.  The Malays, Chinese, Vietnamese, Sea-Gypsies and the Hill-Tribes, for
example, easily come under this category.  
Although constitutional rule was first introduced in Thailand in 1932, Thailand has
already had sixteen constitutions over the last seventy three years.  The present
constitution, promulgated in 1997, is therefore only about eight years old.  It is supposed
to be the most democratic of all the constitutions that Thailand has had so far and yet its
inadequacies have already been a subject of considerable debate and calls have already
been heard of the need to come up with a new constitution! Likewise, although
democracy is not new to Thailand it is only in the last thirteen years or so, that it has had
an uninterrupted history.  Prior to this, for most of its modern history, Thailand was
always either under military rule or ruled by military leaders.  Before 1992, civilian
prime ministers of Thailand were only able to serve for very short terms compared to
their military counterparts and more often than not were booted out of office following a
coup.  For much of its modern history too, Thai politics has not been free from political
violence of one sort or another and often too, it is the State which is among its main
perpetrators.  One could easily look at the political executions of the 1930s, the policies of
forcible assimilation of the early 1940s, the various military coups, the suppression of the
communists in the 1960s, the attempts to quell the 1973 students uprising and the 1976
massacre of the students at Thammasat University as obvious examples of State-
condoned, if not State-sponsored violence.  The State too is obsessed with the idea of its
territorial indivisibility and any real or perceived threat to its sovereignty has always been
dealt with harshly and decisively.  
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The role of Islam in Thailand has also not been fully appreciated.  It is often not
appreciated that Islam in Thailand enjoys both official as well as royal patronage and that
it has long fostered positive and amicable relations with the Thai State historically.  The
Muslims, as a socio-religious community constitute the largest minority in the Thai
kingdom.  There are over 3,113 mosques distributed all over the Thai kingdom and the
number appears to be growing.1) Hence, the population of the Muslims is also significant
although its exact numbers still appear speculative.  The Muslims claim that they
constitute about ten percent of the kingdom’s population while official figures suggest that
they are no more than four percent.2) But even if the modest figure is used, in absolute
terms, it still represents about 2.4 million people, which is bigger than many of the
sovereign member states of the United Nations, like Timor Leste, Brunei, Maldives,
Cyprus, and even Estonia.  If the higher figure is accepted, its significance will no doubt
be even greater.
Nevertheless, the Muslims in Thailand are far from being monolithic.  Broadly, they
may be divided into the Malay-Muslims who constitute the dominant population in the
provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and parts of Songkhla and the Thai-Muslims,
who are to be found in all of the seventy six provinces of Thailand, including the Malay-
Muslim-dominated provinces.  The Malay-Muslims essentially speak Malay rather than
Thai and practise Malay culture which make them culturally distinguishable from the
Thais.  In view of their numerical predominance in the southernmost parts of Thailand
the majority-minority profile is reversed making them the de facto majority ethnic group
and the Thais, the minority group.  The geographical contiguity between the Malay-
Muslim dominated provinces of Thailand with Malaysia, where their ethnic brethren, the
Malays, are the dominant group and the existence of extensive and overlapping kinship,
cultural, religious and educational ties between them transcending their respective
national boundaries, contribute significantly to the resilience of the Malay-Muslim identity
in that part of Thailand.  
The presence of a large number of Malay-Muslims from Thailand in Malaysia as
migrant labourers, vendors as well as restaurant operators has also reinforced their
economic dependence on Malaysia while consolidating their cultural and ethnic affinities
with the Malays.  In the Malay-Muslim-dominated provinces of Thailand, the Thai-
Buddhists are a minority comprising essentially recent migrants from other parts of
Thailand as well as government officials on temporary posting to the region.  Thus, the
Malay-Muslim provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and parts of Songkhla in South
Thailand also, in effect, represent a distinctive and viable Malay-Muslim cultural zone
within the kingdom of Thailand with a strong relationship with their counterparts across
the border in Malaysia.  
On the other hand, the Thai Muslims are a diverse group united only by their Islamic
faith and adoption of Thai culture and identity.  Contrary to conventional views, the
presence of Islam outside the Malay-Muslim provinces, is also significant in any number
of ways although Muslims outside the Malay-Muslim cultural belt appear to have blended
well with the ethnic Thais.  For example, it is estimated that the Muslims make up about
fourteen percent of the population of Chiangmai, in North Thailand, although the
majority are Chinese-Muslims, rather than Malay-Muslims.  The on-going conversion to
Islam from not only ethnic Thais from all over the kingdom but also among the Hill
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Tribes, such as Akha and Hmong, has also not been fully appreciated.3) It is also
significant to note that in the recent general election, a candidate in Constituency One in
Ayutthaya, which is well outside the Malay-Muslim belt, promised to turn Ayutthaya into
a leading centre of halal-food industry in Thailand as a way of appealing to the Muslim
voters, who according to him, make up between twenty to thirty percent of the electorate
in his constituency, a development which clearly illustrates the growing importance of
Islam outside of the Malay-Muslim provinces.4) The province of Satun which borders
Perlis in Malaysia has an overwhelmingly Muslim population, but yet is culturally much
closer to the ethnic Thais.
Although the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in Thailand are Sunni, the Shias
have also for centuries been part of the wider Muslim community in Thailand.  The
Chularatmontri, or Sheikhul–Islam or Head of the Islamic religion in Thailand, serves as the
royal adviser on Islamic affairs and has a tenure for life.  He sits as an ex-officio of the
Central Council for Islamic Affairs, which is the highest organ of the officially-sanctioned
Muslim socio-religious organization in Thailand.  But because freedom of religion is
enshrined in the Thai constitution and is respected in practice, Muslims, like their
Buddhist counterparts, have considerable leeway in determining their particular religious
loyalties or practices.  This, has in an important sense, enabled the different religious
schools and traditions to flourish in Thailand especially in areas outside the Malay-
Muslim dominated provinces but also within these areas.  Schisms and tensions within
Islam in Thailand do exist underlining the fact that the Muslims are far from monolithic.  
Essentially, Islam in Thailand is characterized by diversity.  But what is even more
remarkable is the high degree of inter-religious tolerance and accommodation between
Islam and Buddhism and between the Muslims and the Thai State for much of the
kingdom’s history.  But how do we explain the recent outbreak of violence in the South
which now appears to involve religion in a more direct way.  It would be too early and
too tenuous to suggest that religion or specifically Islam has suddenly become the primary
source of conflict in the South.  The role of Islam in Thailand itself is too complex to
reduce it to a single dimension in trying to understand a phenomenon which is more
plausibly caused by a combination of factors most of which are very local in nature.  An
examination of the recent upsurge in violence in South Thailand should shed more light
on this.
The Upsurge of Violence in the Malay-Muslim Provinces
The recent upsurge of violence in South Thailand cannot possibly be understood
without appreciating its chronological context.  What has recently been labelled as
Muslim militancy actually has a long history although it was rarely described as such
before.  It constitutes an on-going problem for the State especially following the forcible
incorporation of the former Malay Kingdom of Patani, which basically overlaps with the
present-day provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and parts of Songkhla, into the Thai
polity in the historical period.  But history alone cannot provide a satisfactory explanation
of the chronic unrest in that part of Thailand.  It is also misleading to suggest that what is
now referred to as Muslim militancy has been the single-most important aspect of the
problem.  It will become clear in our discussion later that there are also other reasons for
the sudden upsurge of violence in those provinces.  But perhaps at this juncture it would
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be more helpful to just look at the facts pertaining to the recent upsurge of violence.
It is generally believed that the most serious recent violent incident took place on
January 4, 2004, when an organized group of more than fifty men, according to some
sources, raided an army depot in Narathiwat, killing four soldiers and stealing hundreds
of rifles and a large quantity of ammunitions.  Eighteen schools were also simultaneously
set alight in what appeared to be well-coordinated attacks.  Immediately after this incident
more violence broke out with acts of arson, attacks against government officials and
even beheadings of Buddhist monks.  What was most troubling was that if in the past
political violence in the south was invariably vertical in nature, and basically constituted
attacks against the state, its apparatuses and symbols, the new development in the south
marked a radical departure from past precedents in that the target of attacks began to shift
to the horizontal plane involving innocent ordinary people.  Thus, the deterioration of
violence this time round could not have been more alarming.  The crisis in Thailand’s
southern region deteriorated with the imposition of martial law there which failed to stop
the violence.  The situation in the south was described as ‘Thailand’s War Zone’ by a
leading Asian magazine.5)
The kidnap and presumed execution of a prominent Muslim lawyer, Somchai
Neelaphaijit, allegedly by the police, who at the time of his disappearance was responsible
for the defence of five suspected Jemaah Islamiyah [ JI] terrorists under detention and the
allegation that a few Muslim Members of Parliament were behind the unrest further
exacerbated tensions in the Muslim south.  These were high-profiled cases but besides
these there were prevalent complaints by locals of the sudden disappearance of their close
relatives and friends presumed detained and possibly executed by the security forces.
The arbitrary arrests and detention of suspected militants also created widespread fear
among the local people that they would be indiscriminately brutalized by the authorities.
The intrusive inspections of mosques, madrasas and pondoks by the Thai security officials
claiming to look for militants have also aroused the ire of the local people over what was
generally perceived as unjust acts of suppression and recrimination against the Muslims.  
The situation escalated further with the outbreak of another major incident on April 28,
when Thai security forces killed 107 suspected militants, many of whom were members of
a local soccer team, who were accused of planning acts of terrorism.  Thirty-two were
were gunned down inside the historic Kru-ze mosque in Pattani.  A government
appointed commission set up to look into this incident concluded that the level of force
and type of weapons used in the attack on the mosque “was disproportionate to the
threat posed by the militants.” 6) This incident generated even more violence including
arsons, bombings, killings of government officials and security forces and beheadings and
murders of innocent civilians.  The murder of Nusee Yakoh by unidentified assailants on
June 24, 2004, in Tak Bai in Narathiwat Province and the subsequent failure of the
Police to make any arrests undermined the local community’s faith in the impartiality of
the Police force.7)
The latest major episode in this vicious cycle of violence took place on October 25,
2004, in Tak Bai, Narathiwat.  In trying to break up a demonstration at the Tak Bai Police
Station by about a few thousand protesters who were demanding the release of six men
accused of giving weapons to Islamic militants Thai security forces shot dead six
protesters and detained over one-thousand three hundred people.  The detainees were
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then stacked like logs into a number of military trucks and transferred to a military
camp on a journey which lasted as long as five hours for some of the detainees.8) Many
later alleged that they were maltreated and even tortured and abused by the Thai security
forces while under detention.  As a result of this, almost eighty people died of suffocation
while there were also claims that many more had been left unaccounted.  Although
initially the government tried to play down this incident, when news of the incident
broke out, the government came under relentless criticisms from the media, civil society
and the international community.  Muslim governments, from Iran to Indonesia,
protested what they considered as unacceptable treatment of their co-religionists.  The
Malaysian Parliament unanimously passed a resolution on November 23, 2004,
condemning the excessive use of violence by the Thai security forces against Thailand’s
own Muslim citizens.9) Referring partly to this event, the Human Rights Watch, World
Report 2005 suggests that “The steady erosion of respect for human rights in Thailand that
has characterized Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s rule accelerated sharply in
2004.” 10) Following the Tak Bai incident, more violence erupted with rampant revenge
killings of the innocent taking place almost daily.  
Even with extra security being provided during the period leading up to the recent
general election there were continuing cases of violence.  In fact, even after the general
election on February 6, 2005, there were still killings and bombings taking place.  For
example, on February 8, 2005, two locals were seriously injured in a bomb attack on a
hotel in Rangae district of Narathiwat.11) On February 11, 2005, a Yala police officer was
killed and more than 20 onlookers and police were injured after a remote-controlled
bomb exploded near a CD shop.  The owner of the shop had been shot four times just
before the explosion.12) On Sunday, February 13, 2005, it was reported that suspected
militants shot and seriously wounded Manasae Sama-ae in Narathiwat.  In Raman, Yala,
a police officer was killed when a gunman shot him twice in the back as he was riding his
motorcycle and less than an hour later three workers painting the road in the same
district were shot although they survived after being taken to the hospital.  There had
been bombing incidents on five consecutive days in the past week with one targeting the
Governor of Narathiwat while he was inspecting a military parade at a sports stadium.13)
Following this incident, two more bombs went off in Narathiwat province injuring eight
people ahead of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s planned visit to the province.14)
Acts of violence continued to occur right through April of 2005.  In all, almost seven
hundred people have been killed since January 2004 and a general climate of fear and
insecurity still prevails in the south.  
Historical Precedents
How do we read the above phenomena? Perhaps to begin with we have to
acknowledge that inasmuch as the recent spate of violence appears to be escalating, this is
definitely not the first time that the region has witnessed an escalation of violence.  The
history of the Malay-Muslim provinces whether in the traditional or the modern period
has always been characterized by some form of political struggle or other, violent or
otherwise.  In the post-Second World War period, when de-colonization was the trend,
the Malays tried to organize various kinds of resistance against the modern Thai state
although without success.  Various irredentist and separatist movements like GAMPAR,
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“New Malaya,” Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP), Barisan Revolusi Pattani
(BRN) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), have emerged at different
points of time to pursue the goals of autonomy or independence for the Muslims.15)
W.K.Che Man, in his book, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the
Malays of Southern Thailand, has also traced the evolution of Malay-Muslim separatism in
Thailand in some detail.16) There were also other minor or ad hoc separatist organisations
like Sabil-illah, Black December 1902, United Pattani Freedom Movement and Bersatu,
which in their different ways all tried to pursue the goals of separatism from the Thai state.  
Although all the above organizations were different from one another and existed at
different times and under separate leadership they were invariably united by the common
goal of seeking either greater autonomy or independence from Thailand.  It would be
useful to look at the main demands made by Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, a highly
respected religious leader, and President of the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs of
Pattani, to the Thai government in April 1947, the gist of which continues to be relevant
until today.  These were that there should be:
A single Malay Governor for the existing Malay provinces
Eighty percent of officials should be Muslim
Malay should be given equal status with Thai and should be introduced into primary
schools
Islamic law be administered in separate courts, not from within the Thai legal system
Revenues raised in the region kept for the welfare and development of the region.17)
For leading the resistance movement, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir was detained for a
few years and later released only to disappear presumed kidnapped and murdered by the
authorities.  The same demands for greater recognition of their cultural and religious
distinctiveness continued to be made to successive Thai administrations by leaders of the
different Malay-Muslim separatist organizations with very little success.
The basic problem facing Thailand in its relations with its Malay-Muslim minority for
the past six decades does not seem to have changed very much: how to integrate the
Malay-Muslims into the Thai polity without alienating them? The insightful observation
made by M. Ladd Thomas way back in 1975 still seems equally valid today as it was then
when he concluded that:
“Geographical propinquity, historical heritage, local unfamiliarity with the
administrative system, and resentment of bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour,
absence of meaningful social intercourse between the Muslim and Buddhist
communities, concentration of wealth in the hands of non-Muslims, deteriorating
economic conditions, and failure of authorities to provide protection for the local
people have all contributed to a sense of alienation on the part of Muslims in the
region, as well to a belief that they are treated as second class citizens.” 18)
But how did the Thai State respond to the problem.  There is no doubt that it was an
historical accident that the Malay-Muslim provinces were incorporated into the modern
Thai polity but it is now a contemporary reality that those provinces now constitute an
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integral part of modern Thailand which is uncompromisingly obsessed with the notion of
its territorial indivisibility.  Thus, Thailand’s perception of the potential threat arising from
the Malay-Muslim provinces to its territorial integrity has always been governed by
feelings of nervousness and insecurity.  The attitudes and policies adopted by successive
Thai governments have always been a function of the above sense of anxiety and
insecurity.  The Thai attitudes towards the demands of the Malay-Muslims of the southern
border provinces have always fluctuated between accommodation and confrontation.
Thailand had been willing to accept certain conciliatory principles and actions at certain
points of time, but had, at other times been unbending on what it perceived as its non-
negotiable terrain.  
In view of the relatively respectable degree of religious tolerance in Thailand,
successive Thai governments have had little problem accommodating Islam as a religious
system provided it is divorced from or devoid of political demands and Malay identity
which is generally viewed as a competing identity for Thailand.  Thai governments too
have demonstrated their preparedness to use Islam as an instrument or means to
assimilate or integrate the Malay-Muslims into mainstream Thai society.  Successive
Thai regimes have attempted to do this in a range of ways including co-opting the
already assimilated Thai-Muslims from the other regions in Thailand to undertake the
political socialization of the Malay-Muslims to bring about their speedier re-orientation
towards Thailand.  At various periods of its recent history too, Thai governments have
even undertaken affirmative action in favour of the Malay-Muslims to facilitate their
political integration and co-option into Thailand.  Some concessions have been given to
the Malay-Muslims in terms of private education, university enrollment and even job
placements provided they are willing to assimilate or at least integrate.  
But, on the other hand, the Thai state especially its security apparatuses, has been
consistently intolerant of any signs of secessionism or perceived threat to its territorial
sovereignty and would resort to the use of disproportionate force to eliminate this threat.
To what extent a particular Thai regime is prepared to be more accommodating or
confrontational towards the Malay-Muslims depends, among other things, on the
particular political system in operation at any particular period of time and the personality
of its leaders.  Since 1932 however, Thailand has been for the greater part of its history,
ruled by authoritarian military dictatorships than democratic governments.  It was only
since 1992 that Thai democracy has enjoyed uninterrupted existence.  Hence it is not
difficult to imagine that for most of Thailand’s recent history, it was the confrontational
way that was dominant with its intended and unintended consequences.  Democratic
regimes, however, tended to be more sensitive to the local sensibilities and therefore
apparently more accommodating to the Malay-Muslims.
Successive Thai governments, whether democratic or authoritarian, recognize that
the threat to Thailand in the deep south is basically due to the politics of identity.  The
continued maintenance and potential manipulation of the Malay-Muslim identity by the
Malay-Muslims could undermine the Thai claim to legitimacy in that part of Thailand.
Thus, the strategy adopted to counter this threat has always been to weaken the
foundation of this competing identity, basically through its educational, linguistic and
social policies.  
The Malay-Muslim responses to the new demands of Thai citizenship as determined by
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Bangkok have also not been clear-cut, vacillating between resistance and cooperation.
The resistance took at least two forms, namely, 1] outright physical armed separatist
struggle against the Thai state, and/or 2] organized non-violent demands for the state to
respect their cultural privacy.  Cooperation, on the other hand, involved working with the
state to reform the Malay-Muslim cultural space, particularly its educational institutions
and orientations to conform to the conciliatory gestures of the state.  This includes
modernizing and nationalizing the pondok school system to allow for the incorporation of
the secular national curricula alongside the religious curricula.
As evident in the foregoing discussion, although the different Malay-Muslim separatist
movements had different leaderships and orientations they were invariably united and
consistent in their demands for their cultural distinctiveness as a people to be respected.
Essentially Malay-Muslim separatism has been a reaction to the perceived denial of
their basic rights as an indigenous people.  The different times when the separatist
movements were established or when separatist violence flared up in the Malay-Muslim
provinces invariably coincided with the period when the Malay-Muslims felt that they
were being subjected to injustices and that their fundamental rights were being threatened.
It is also interesting to observe that the Malay-Muslim cooperation with the Thai state
had always occurred during the democratic era or at least when there was some
semblance of democracy.  It was, for example, during the premiership of General Prem
Tinasulanonda that Prime Ministerial Decree 66//23 decree was issued on April 23,
1980, to spell out the new National Security Policy which among other things underlined
the shift in approach from military confrontation to peaceful initiatives and to support the
democratization process.  Although the policy was basically intended to tackle the
communist insurgency it also had a positive effect in overcoming the Malay-Muslim
separatist insurgency at that time.  Following this development, when General Harn
Linanonda was appointed as Commander of the fourth Army Division which was based
in the South, he issued Decree number 751/2524 outlining a new Southern Pacification
Policy which was well received in the South especially among the Muslims.  It was the
above conciliatory gestures that significantly contributed towards resolving the problem of
Malay-Muslim insurgency at that time.  
Further democratic developments helped consolidate the political framework which
made it possible for the Malay-Muslims to assert an important public role in Thailand.  In
the post-1992 period, Malay-Muslim Members of Parliament formed a parliamentary
Wahdah faction to protect and promote their collective interests through political
bargaining and negotiation within their own political party and in the parliament.  Muslim
representation in government during this period was at an unprecedented level.  There
were thirteen Muslim members of Parliament in 1992 [both in the March and September
elections] and fourteen in 1995.  After the 2001 general election which was held according
to the provisions of the 1997 Constitution, the number of Muslim members of the House
of Representatives rose to twenty one.19)
Notwithstanding the above positive development, a low-level threat of armed
separatism remained.  Outbreaks of violence continued to take place although this was
not necessarily connected to separatism.  But it was not until the developments of the
post-September 11 incident especially after President Bush’s declaration of the global ‘war
on terror’ and Thaksin Shinawatra’s immediate support of that policy that a new wave of
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violence, conveniently attributed to Muslim militancy, erupted in the South.  It is perhaps
no coincidence that according to a recent study undertaken by Professor Srisompop
Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University, out of a total of 1975 violent incidents that
were recorded between 1993 and the end of November, 2004, only twenty one percent
occurred before 2001 in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat
while the rest took place when Thaksin Shinawatra came to power.  He further highlights
that, in the first 11 months of 2004, 1253 violent incidents were recorded, which was sixty
three per cent of the total over the period of eleven years.  The figure for 2004 was
ninteen times higher than the average of sixty six such incidents taking place each year
between 1993 and 2003.20)
The facts speak for themselves.  While it is difficult to deny that there were plenty of
historical precedents to the recent Muslim militancy in South Thailand, it was definitely
the regime change in Thailand in 2001 when Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime Minister
and openly aligned himself with the U.S. in its global war on terror that the scenario was
set in the Malay-Muslim provinces for a new round of conflict.  The dispatch of Thai
soldiers to Iraq in 2003 against the backdrop of strong Muslim opposition to the move,
although withdrawn a year later, had also inflamed local Muslim feelings against the
government.
Muslim Militancy: Differing Perceptions
Most analyses of the crisis in the south, no matter what position they take, tend to
assume that essentially the problem is one directly caused by Malay-Muslim separatist
insurgency or Muslim militancy which has apparently been fuelled by the economic
marginalization, poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment of the Muslims in that
part of Thailand.  The prevailing perception by the Thai security establishment is that the
conflict in the deep South is basically a function of Muslim militancy.  The government
has wavered between blaming local criminal elements for the troubles in the South and
accusing ‘outsiders’ for promoting violence.  Some quarters have also tried to suggest that
the violence in the South has been inspired by international terrorism although Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has not publicly endorsed this view.  He has, though, been
consistent in accusing local thugs and ‘crazy’ Islamic teachers for fuelling the violence.
One foreign analyst has even argued that there is an international jihadi perspective to
the problem suggesting that the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami [HUJI] in Bangladesh, which is
linked to Bin Laden’s International Islamic Front [IIF] may have been involved in
supporting the Muslim insurgency in Thailand.21) The arrest of Riduan Isamuddin in
August 2003, better known as Hambali, an alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiyah[JI]which
was attributed the blame for a series of bombings in Indonesia, in Thailand was often
suggested as evidence of the presence of international terrorists in the kingdom although
there is no proof that he was in contact with the local insurgents in the South.  Earlier, a
senior Thai intelligence official had expressed concerns that the JI was trying to recruit
followers in southern Thailand and that the region was becoming a breeding ground for
international terrorists.22) The arrests, detention and current trial of a number of Malay-
Muslims suspected of having links with a Singaporean Muslim convert of Chinese origin
accused of being a JI member, now held in Singapore, also tend to create the impression
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that there is some connection between international terrorist groups and Muslim militancy
in the South.
This dominant government view of the cause of the conflict and its prospective
remedy, however, is not shared by the majority of the Muslims who think that they are
being unfairly targeted and victimized by the Thai security forces and the local
government machinery, on the pretext of fighting Muslim militancy and international
terrorism.  A Muslim Senator from Narathiwat, Fadruddin Boto bluntly suggested that the
local Muslims believe that the C.I.A. was trying to turn the southern problem into an
international problem.23)
The views articulated by the former Foreign Minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan,
himself a Muslim from Nakhorn Sri Thammarat, in an article published in the Bangkok
Post perhaps best sum up the Malay-Muslim perception of the crisis in the South.  He
argues that “The struggle in the deep South has a deeper cultural dimension that is
being overlooked by the national leadership at the present.  They are feeling that their
cultural space is being violated.  They first questioned about the interest (usury) they, as
Muslims, would have to pay to the village funds providing personal loans to them.  They
were severely affected by the shooting spree unleashed during the anti drug campaigns
when many of their innocent relatives were cut down without any due process of law.
They were concerned with the ‘underground lottery’ being turned into ‘above the ground’
and therefore ‘legalized.’ They are now anxious about ‘scholarship funds’ being
distributed from that ‘legalized gambling.’ They are deeply anxious about plans to register
brothels and prostitutes.  They are extremely worried about the idea of ‘legalized casinos’
being contemplated by the Government.” 24)
Implications of the On-going Violence
There are at least eight observations that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion.  
First, the security situation in southern Thailand is no doubt serious and dangerous.
The nature and frequency of the violence is cause for concern.  It must be worrying for
the government that although Thailand is still supposed to be practising democracy,
due to the recent troubles, martial law and curfew had to be imposed in many areas in the
Malay-Muslim provinces, to contain the disturbances and retrieve any semblance of the
governability of the region.  
Second, it was probably the fear of potential terrorist attacks on Western targets in
Thailand that had prompted the Thai security forces, working in liaison with their
Western counterparts to adopt aggressive pre-emptive measures to strike at Muslim
targets like mosques, madrasas and pondoks to flush out suspected militants although this
apparently had the adverse effect of alienating more people.  The declaration of the
global war on terror by President Bush and the adoption of the doctrine of pre-emptive
strikes directly contributed to revive the issue of national security in governance in
Thailand and with that the renewed dominance of the role of the state security
apparatuses, especially the military and the police, who saw themselves as the natural
custodians of Thai national security.  This development inevitably led to the reassessment
of the security threat in the Malay-Muslim provinces and the adoption of new strategies to
handle it with ramifications on the ordinary citizens in the south in general and the
Malay-Muslims in particular.  Emboldened by Thailand’s alliance with the United States
77
on the issue of global terrorism, the Thai security forces exploited the fear of terrorism to
pursue aggressive policies against the Malay-Muslims.  This policy led to the growing
perception among a large cross-section of the Malay-Muslims that the global war on terror
was actually a war against Islam.  Their latent fear that there appears to be a hidden
conspiracy to rob them of their freedom, identity and religion has been revived.  There
was also growing sympathy for the co-religionists in Palestine and Iraq who were
perceived as victims of this global conspiracy against Islam.  The dispatch of the Thai
troops to be part of the U.S. led coalition in Iraq had only served to reinforce their
suspicions about the suspicious intentions of the state or at least the outright disrespect to
their feelings and sensitivities.
Third, the extra-judicial killings that were sanctioned by the government beginning on
February 1, 2003, as part of its ‘brutal measures’ to combat illicit drug trafficking and
trade, which caused the loss of over 2,500 lives also contributed to the deteriorating
violence in the region.  In the Muslim south, this became a highly controversial issue and
many Malay-Muslims claimed they were being targeted for the wrong reasons.
Fourth, Muslim militancy, broadly defined to mean any form of violence involving the
Muslims in one way or other has definitely been part of the violent landscape of the South
but it is far from monolithic.  Muslim militancy in South Thailand has various shades of
motives as well as expressions.  It was the failure of the Thai government to understand
these differences that had contributed to exacerbate the problem.
Fifth, as demonstrated by the April 28 armed showdown with the alleged militants and
the Tak Bai Incident, violence was not the monopoly of the militants as the Thai
government itself was equally accountable for it through its use of disproportionate force
to quell opposition to it.  The allegations that the Muslims have been making, that the
violence in the south, especially the arbitrary kidnap of Muslims suspected of being
separatists, leading to their disappearance and execution, has also been the result of the
actions of corrupt and high-handed security officials appear more credible now.  
Sixth, the role of criminal elements and ‘hired assassins’ has also been a factor in the
recent violence.
Seventh, there appears to be an element of continuity in the unrest.  There is a history
of armed Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency in that part of Thailand.  Although as a
political ideology, the cause of Malay-Muslim separatism had been severely emasculated
in the recent decade or so partly due to the Thailand’s own democratic development and
partly, the changing regional scene brought about by the consolidation of ASEAN as a
regional body committed to respecting the territorial sovereignty of its members, Malay-
Muslim cultural separatism or cultural space has been more difficult to eliminate and its
continued existence constitutes a serious challenge to Thailand’s claim to being a
culturally homogeneous state.  
Eighth, what is intriguing is the fact that government seems to be unsure, or at best,
ambivalent about the causes of Muslim militancy in the South.  There were, at times, even
public differences of opinion among government leaders, bureaucrats and politicians as
who to blame for the unrest.  Thai military leaders tend to apportion the blame to
Muslim militants with nuanced allegations that international terrorist groups, including Al-
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah [JI], have had a role in this.  Other officials have tried to
insinuate that foreign hands might be involved with Malaysia emerging as the prime
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suspect.  Thailand’s prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, for a long time, probably acting
on the advice of his Muslim cabinet colleague, Muhammad Nor Mattha, kept insisting
that the crisis in the south was essentially the work of local ‘thugs’ and ‘insurgents’.25) This
could also have been due to the fact that, as a democratically-elected leader and as a
politician, he had to be more circumspect than the Thai security people, so as not to
alienate or antagonize the majority of the Malay-Muslims with unsubstantiated or
controversial claims.  Pointing the accusing finger at the bad elements within the broader
Malay-Muslim society was probably a politically correct thing to do.
Conclusion
It is fairly obvious from the above analysis that the on-going violence in South
Thailand is in itself an indication of democracy in crisis.  Muslim Members of Parliament
and Senators who tried to speak up on behalf of the people had been accused of
instigating militancy and had therefore been made ineffective.  Martial law is still in
place in the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat and a curfew has also been
imposed at selected times.  There is also a general air of fear, anxiety and insecurity in the
whole region.  The Muslims complain of continual harassment and intimidation by the
security forces and the Buddhists complain that they now feel very vulnerable.  It is
difficult for the people to lead a normal life under the circumstances.  But it would be a
mistake to attribute all the blame to Muslim militancy for the present crisis in southern
Thailand.  This view has been echoed by Anand Panyarachun, the Chairman of the
National Reconciliation Commission, who observes that “perhaps half of the violence in
the three southernmost provinces resulted from illegal smuggling, business disputes and
the illicit drug trade.” 26) Muslim militancy is a problem and perhaps can become a
bigger problem if not properly handled but as it is, it is not an insurmountable problem.
Militancy is unlikely to provide the solution to the problems facing the Muslims.  On the
contrary, it can be counter-productive.  Religion is not the central issue in the on-going
violence although there have been attempts to manipulate religion by several interested
parties.  It is misleading to imagine that Islam is solely represented by the militants as
there is a silent Muslim majority which has nothing to do with any kind of militancy.  In
addition to this, there is also a significant Muslim presence in the government at all
levels including the outgoing cabinet, the local bureaucracy and the security forces
although the number may be small.  Some Muslims may have perpetrated violence but
many more have also become its victims.  The problem in the South is far too complex to
come up with simple solutions.  
There is a growing view that the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak
Thai party must also be apportioned the blame for creating the conditions which have
revived old anxieties and tensions in the Malay-Muslim provinces.  Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra’s C.E.O.-style of leadership which demands quick and effective
solutions to problems has apparently not been very helpful in the Malay-Muslim region in
view of the fact that some of these problems are chronic in nature and have been there for
decades.  The idea that there are instant solutions to all the woes of the region is
unrealistic.  The mutual distrust between the bureaucracy, especially the military and the
police, on the one hand, and the local population, on the other, needs to be fully
understood and delicately approached.  The voices of the common people have to be
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heard and their just grievances addressed.  
The general election on February 6, 2005, in Thailand became a crucial referendum on
the extent of support that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai
Party enjoyed in the southern provinces after being in power for four years.  As it turned
out, although the Thai Rak Thai Party won overwhelmingly in all the provinces of
Thailand securing more than a two-thirds majority, it suffered a major setback in the
southern provinces where it lost all but one constituency.  The only constituency that Thai
Rak Thai Party won, was in Phangga and that too by a very slim majority.  In the
Malay-Muslim provinces not a single Thai Rak Thai Party candidate won in the
Constituencies: the only Thai Rak Thai candidate to have secured a respectable defeat,
losing only by a marginal count, Najmuddin Uma, an outgoing Member of Parliament,
was the very person accused by the security forces of instigating Muslim militancy! The
results of the election in the South clearly indicate that the people there reject Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s hard-line approach in handling the crisis in the Malay-
Muslim provinces.  There was a chorus of calls from religious and community leaders in
the South for the government to abandon its ‘violent approach’ and lift the martial law
that was in force.27) This was actually the same message that the Chularatmontri, the
Muslim spiritual leader in Thailand, gave just before the election when he said that “the
use of force cannot solve the problem.  It needs a gentle approach, understanding, and
[the exercise] of reason.  The more force [is] used, the more violent the problem will
become.” 28) He further pleaded to the Thai public,” The Muslims in the South also love
the country.  Don’t stereotype them as separatists.  Regard them in a just way.” It is
instructive to note that he believed that the causes of violence in the South remain
unclear because the problems are ‘complex and cumulative.” 29)
Notes:
1) This figure is the latest compiled by the Thai Parliamentary Senate Committee.
2) See Omar Farouk Bajunid “The Muslims in Thailand: A Review,” To¯nan Ajia Kenkyu¯ (Southeast Asian
Studies), Vol. 37, No. 2, September 1999, 222.
3) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 November 2004.
4) See Election Pamphlet of the candidate of the Democrat Party in Constituency One, Ayutthaya, Mr.
Suthat Atirojanasakul in the February 6, 2005 general election.
5) Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March 2004
6) HRW 2005. World Report 2005: Events of 2004. New York: Human Rights Watch, 327.
7) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 November 2004.
8) The Report of the Government-Commissioned investigation into the Tak Bai Incident has been partially
released to the public by Mr. Anand Panyarachun, Chairman of the National Reconciliation
Commission. Details of the treatment of the detainees during their detention which led to so many deaths
are given in this Report.
9) Utusan Malaysia, 24 November 2004.
10) HRW 2005. World Report 2005, op.cit., 326.
11) Bangkok Post, 9 February 2005.
12) The Nation, 12 February 2005.
13) The Nation, 13 February 2005.
14) The Nation, 14 February 2005.
15) See Omar Farouk “The historical and transnational dimensions of Malay-Muslim separatism in Southern
80
Thailand,” Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), especially 237–243.
16) Wan Kadir bin Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern
Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 98–112.
17) Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London and
New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), 174.
18) M. Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand, Occasional Paper No. 28
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), 26–27.
19) Omar Farouk Bajunid “Islam, Nationalism and the Thai State” in Wattana Sugunnasil ed. Dynamic
Diversity in Southern Thailand (Chiangmai: Prince of Songkhla University and Silkworm, 2005), 13.
20) Srisompop Jitpiromsri 2004. “One Decade and A Year of Violence in the Southern Border: Mysteries of
the Problem and Solution.” Research Report. Pattani: Prince of Songkhla University [in Thai].
21) See B. Raman “Thailand and International Islamic Front,” Paper No. 890, South Asia Analysis Group,
09-01-2004.
22) Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March 2004.
23) Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March 2004.
24) Bangkok Post, 1 August 2004.
25) Although Muhammad Nor Mattha was re-elected in the recent Thai general election on the Thai Rak
Thai party list, he has been dropped from the new Thaksin cabinet.  There is no Muslim representation
at the cabinet level at present.
26) The Nation, 8 May 2005.
27) The Nation, 9 February 2005.
28) Bangkok Post, 5 February 2005.
29) Bangkok Post, 5 February 2005.
81
